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ABSTRACT
We present a theory of the organization of work in an economy where knowledge is an essential
input in production: a knowledge economy. In this economy a continuum of agents with
heterogeneous skills must choose how much knowledge to acquire and may produce on their own
or in organizations. Our theory generates an assignment of workers to positions, a wage structure,
and a continuum of knowledge-based hierarchies. Organization allows low skill agents to ask others
for directions. Thus, they acquire less knowledge than in isolation. In contrast, organization allows
high skill agents to leverage their knowledge through large teams. Hence, they acquire more
knowledge than on their own. As a result, organization decreases wage inequality within workers,
but increases income inequality among the highest skill agents. We also show that equilibrium
assignments and earnings can be interpreted as the outcome of alternative market institutions such
as firms, or consulting and referral markets. We use our theory to study the impact of information
and communication technology, and contrast its predictions with US evidence.
Luis Garicano












erossi@stanford.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Production of most goods and services depends on the skills of agents involved in production.
Organizations allow individuals to combine and leverage their knowledge, thereby eﬀectively
expanding the time of able agents by allowing them to use the help of less able agents in
production. Recent improvements in information technology have aﬀected how knowledge
is acquired and communicated, and thus how production is organized in the economy. Yet
the idea of organizing to optimize the use of knowledge has been virtually absent from
economic theory. In this paper, we study an economy where knowledge is an essential
input in production, and where diﬀerences in individual skills to acquire knowledge are the
main driver of earnings inequality. We explore how, in equilibrium, organization allows
individuals with diﬀerent skills to combine their knowledge, the roles that individuals play
in production, and the associated structure of earnings.
We introduce a theory of a knowledge economy that has four main elements: produc-
tion requires knowledge; individuals are heterogeneous in cognitive skill; communication is
possible; and organization is hierarchical. On her own, an agent encounters one problem
per unit of time and she only produces if she can solve it, which happens whenever the
diﬃculty of the problem is below her level of knowledge. Problems are drawn from a known
probability distribution. Agents can acquire knowledge at a cost, and decide optimally how
much knowledge to acquire. They diﬀer in how costly it is for them to acquire knowledge
— in particular there exists a continuum of agents of diﬀerent cognitive skill.1 Agents can
communicate at a cost and thus help each other solve problems. This allows for the for-
mation of organizations in which agents specialize in either production or problem solving.
Production workers draw problems and learn how to solve routine problems, while problem
solvers learn to solve the more diﬃcult problems, and contribute their knowledge to produc-
tion workers as needed. Multiple layers of increasingly more skilled problem solvers may be
needed in order to solve the hardest problems and eﬀectively leverage the knowledge of the
most skilled. That is, organizations take the form of ‘knowledge-based hierarchies.’2 The
1Our focus on individual skill heterogeneity as the basis for organizational heterogeneity is consistent with
recent empirical work on the structure of wages. In particular, recent work using matched ﬁrm-worker data
(e.g. Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1999) ﬁnds that ‘virtually all of the interindustry wage diﬀerentials
is accounted for by variation in average individual heterogeneity between sectors.’ Moreover, the empirical
literature on skill diﬀerentials has found cognitive skills to be a very good predictor of wage diﬀerentials (see
Murnane, Willett and Levy, 1995).
2As in Garicano (2000) this organizational structure is optimal when matching problems and solutions is
costly.
1economy-wide problem is an assignment problem in which agents must acquire knowledge,
solve problems for each other and be assigned to an occupation and to a particular layer of
one of many possible hierarchical structures.
In this economy wages play an allocative role. Production is not only determined by
the total amount of units of knowledge hired by a given team, but also by how these units
are distributed among team members. The role of wages is then to provide agents with
incentives to join particular production teams depending on their ability. The resulting
earnings structure compensates agents for increases in talent more than proportionally. To
see this, consider an individual that is more skilled than others, so that in autarchy she
can earn more. Suppose now that she is allowed to help others solve their problems. Her
earnings relative to others with less knowledge will be higher than in autarchy. First, holding
knowledge constant, she spends a larger fraction of her time on the problems she knows and
others do not — she leverages her knowledge over a larger amount of problems. Second, her
knowledge about unusual problems is now used more often, thus raising the marginal value
of learning and leading her to acquire more knowledge — further increasing her earnings.
An equilibrium in this economy exists, is unique, and is eﬃcient. Moreover, it displays
three features of particular empirical interest. First, it displays positive sorting, in the
sense that higher ability agents share their knowledge with higher ability subordinates
(production workers or lower level managers). The reason is that eﬃciency requires that
the expertise of more skilled problem solvers be shielded from easy questions, and thus
those posing questions to them must themselves be among the most skilled in their rank
or layer. Second, earnings grow faster than individual’s ability to solve problems. More
skilled individuals solve problems for larger teams and are also assigned to higher layers in
the hierarchy. This implies that hierarchies allow the more skilled agents to leverage their
talent more, thereby increasing their returns to knowledge. Thus, organization accentuates
the ability diﬀerentials between the most and least talented individuals. Third, regardless
of the distribution of skills, individuals are segmented by cognitive skill in the sense that the
original continuous agent skill set is partitioned in layers in a systematic way. In particular,
the less skilled agents are production workers, the following agents by cognitive skill are ﬁrst
level problem solvers, the next are second level problem solvers, and so forth. That is, in
the language of the matching literature, the economy does not display perfect segregation,
where all those in the team have the precise same skill (e.g. Kremer 1993), but rather ‘skill
stratiﬁcation’— those with similar skill are in the same position (technically, the skill set in
an occupation is connected).
2Our analysis shows that the equilibrium in our model results from three alternative
decentralizations, corresponding to three existing institutions: ﬁrst, hierarchies structured
as ﬁrms with production workers and managers, where production workers deal with routine
problems and managers with the exceptions;3 second, consulting markets, where those
involved in production pay fees to more knowledgeable problem solvers for help in solving
their problem; third, referral markets, where agents can sell the problems whose solution
they do not know to other agents at a price that decreases in the diﬃculty of the problem,
as revealed by the skill of the agents who tried to solve it but could not. Our analysis thus
pins down the boundary of the problem-solving hierarchy, but not the boundary of the ﬁrm.
We view the ability of the model to predict transactions of knowledge in hierarchies within
ﬁrms, or across them, as a richness of the model, since this duality is also a feature of the
real world.4
Our model sheds some light on the impact of information technology (IT) on wages
and organization. The analysis distinguishes two aspects of IT: its impact on the cost
of communication among agents (e.g., e-mail and mobile technologies) and its ability to
improve access to stored information through improvements in data storage and searching
(e.g., decreases in the cost of information processing). We show that these two diﬀerent
aspects of information technology aﬀect wage inequality and organization in diﬀerent ways.
First, decreases in the cost of communication lead teams to rely more on problem solvers,
increasing the centralization of the economy — more problems are solved at the top of the
hierarchy. In other words, they decrease the knowledge-content of production work. As a
result, wage inequality among workers decreases, but wage inequality among top managers,
and between them and workers, increases. Organizations also change as spans of control
increase, as does the number of layers of problem solvers. Intuitively, improvements in
communication technology generate a type of ‘superstar’ (Rosen, 1981) eﬀect, whereby
each top level manager can better leverage their knowledge.
In contrast, reductions in the cost of accessing knowledge increase the number of prob-
3Empirically, such hierarchies are commonly observed within functional or product areas in organizations.
In a calling center, a low skill agent takes a call, and if she cannot solve it she passes it to her more experienced
manager; in a manufacturing ﬁr m ,ap r o d u c t i o nw o r k e rt r i e st os o l v eap r o b l e mﬁrst and if she can not passes
it to the skilled shop steward; in a consulting ﬁrm, associates and analysists try to solve the easier problems
and partners deal with the harder ones.
4Although we choose not to settle this indeterminacy formally, arguments from the broader theory of the
ﬁrm (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986) may apply to the question of when should knowledge transactions take
place within ﬁrms. These arguments could potentially be incorporated in our framework. Empirically, as
long as the determinants of the boundaries of the ﬁrm are not aﬀected signiﬁcantly by exogenous variables,
changes in the size of hierarchies result in corresponding changes in the size of ﬁrms.
3lems solved by agents at all organizational layers. This technological change results in an
increase in the knowledge content of production work and thus to an increase in wage in-
equality within a given layer, as well as wage inequality in the economy as a whole. It
also leads to an increase in spans of control and, if communication costs are high enough,
to a decrease in the number of layers. We ﬁnd the distinction between information and
communication technology helpful in interpreting the available evidence on the impact of
technological change in the past decades.
This paper contributes to three strands in the literature: the one that studies the impact
of technology on the labor market; the one on hierarchies; and the one on continuous
matching models. We describe brieﬂy its relation to these literatures in turn. First, a recent
theoretical literature has studied the impact of technology on the labor market, motivated
by the recent changes in wage inequality. Within this literature, Saint Paul (2000) explores
the impact of knowledge on the structure of earnings, studying team formation and selection
when there are spillovers between worker’s skills. Other theoretical contributions studying
the link between technology and the structure of earnings have focused on issues such as the
possibility of reverse causation from skills to technology (Acemoglu, 1998), the impact on
within wage inequality of within group ability distinctions (Galor and Moav, 2000), the role
of worker heterogeneity in the ability to implement new technologies (Galor and Tsiddon,
1997), capital-skill complementarity (Krusell, et. al. (2000)), or the impact of market size
on specialization (Mobius, 2000). None of these papers embed the analysis of the impact
of technology on the labor market in a model of hierarchical organization, and thus none
of them delivers implications for the organizational structure of teams and ﬁrms, or for the
occupational distribution of the labor force, which are a focus of this paper.
Second, a large recent literature has studied the internal organization of hierarchies,
that is, how hierarchies process information, monitor performance, allocate resources, or
facilitate knowledge acquisition.5 Papers in this literature solve the ﬁrm optimization prob-
lem without embedding it in an equilibrium framework. In particular, previous work has
ignored the interactions between the hierarchy’s design problem and the labor market that
are the focus of this paper. Two exceptions are Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982). Lucas
(1978) presents the ﬁrst equilibrium model of occupational choice: agents of diﬀerent man-
agerial skill control teams of homogeneous production workers — thus no within worker wage
5See for example Van Zandt (1998), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991),
Qian (1994), and Garicano (2000).
4inequality or matching is possible. Rosen (1982) develops an equilibrium model of hierar-
c h i e si nw h i c hw o r k e r sa r ed i ﬀerentiated. However, his analysis has three limitations that
our paper addresses. First, in his model there is perfect substitution between quantity and
quality of workers — only eﬃciency units matter. As a result, matching plays no role. This
has the implication that the assignment of agents to teams is undetermined. Second, Rosen
does not characterize fully the equilibrium: issues such as whether perfect stratiﬁcation
takes place or not are left open. Third, the generic multiplicative technology he assumes is
silent about the actual role of managers and workers, and as a result does not allow for the
study of the impact of speciﬁc technological changes.
A third strand to which this paper contributes is the literature on frictionless matching
models, started by Tinbergen (1956). A key result in this literature is that when produc-
tion functions are symmetric and supermodular, the equilibrium assignment of individuals
to teams (Kremer, 1993) or couples (Becker, 1981) involves self-matching or segregation.
However, as Kremer and Maskin (1996) have remarked, such symmetric production func-
tions face important empirical challenges: self-matching implies little or no within-ﬁrm
heterogeneity in individuals’ ability or earnings, and cannot account for some key empirical
facts about wage inequality. They argue that to generate these empirical patterns, as well
as outcomes in which individuals’ positions correspond closely to their ability, production
functions must involve complementarity between tasks, imperfect substitutability between
skills (so that matching matters), and asymmetric sensitivity to ability.6 The production
function we suggest has these three properties and thus advances this literature in three
respects. First, we allow for hierarchical, that is many to one, matching. Second, occupa-
tional choice is endogenous. Third, agents may be in multiple layer hierarchies, and thus
matching is multiple-sided.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3d e ﬁnes and characterizes a competitive equilibrium. Section 4 studies the equilibrium
impact of IT. Section 5 contrasts our theory to US evidence and Section 6 concludes. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
6See Sattinger (1993) for a general literature review and Legros and Newman (2002) for a theoretical re-
view that uniﬁes existing results and delivers some new ones. An alternative approach within this literature
is, rather than matching individuals to each other, like in the papers we discuss in the text, to start from an
exogenous distribution of worker types and tasks and study how individuals are assigned to tasks in equilib-
rium (Teulings, 1995 and 2005). An advantage of our ap p r o a c hi st h a ti ta l l o w su st om a k ei n f e r e n c e so nt h e
organization of work (spans, layers, and knowledge content of the jobs) and the occupational distribution,
as well as on wage inequality.
52 The Model
We model an economy in which agents of heterogeneous ability learn to solve tasks, choose
an occupation, and a team to join. The available occupations are diﬀerent layers of problem
solving and production. Agents supply a unit of time, which may be used in production
or in helping others solve problems. The equilibrium allocation in the economy determines
wages for all agents, the tasks they perform, and the composition and structure of teams.
2.1 Production and Knowledge
Production requires labor and knowledge. Agents spend time in production and must solve
the problems they confront in order to produce. In particular, agents draw one problem
per unit of time spent in production. Output is 1 if the problem is solved, and 0 otherwise.
A problem can be solved instantaneously by an agent who has enough knowledge. Some
problems are more common than others. Problems are ranked by the likelihood that they
will be confronted, so that problem Z is associated with a continuous density f(Z) and
c.d.f. F (Z),w h e r ef0(Z) < 0.
Solving problems requires knowledge. All agents must learn the most common problems
before learning the less common ones, so that more knowledgeable agents know everything
that less knowledgeable ones do, and more. That is, knowledge is cumulative. The knowl-
edge of an agent is then characterized by a number e z ∈ R+, signifying that an agent can
solve all problems Z ∈ [0,e z]. To simplify the discussion and notation, we deﬁne the propor-
tion of problems a worker can solve as q = F(e z). Then e z = z(q), where z(·)=F−1(·), and
so z0 > 0,z00 > 0 (by the properties of f(·)). Thus, z(q) denotes the knowledge an agent
needs to acquire in order to solve a proportion q of problems.
Agents diﬀer in their cognitive ability so that higher ability agents incur lower learning
costs. We assume the distribution of ability in the population can be described by a con-
tinuous density function, α ∼ φ(α), with support in [0,1].I np a r t i c u l a r ,w ed e ﬁne ability
so that the cost of learning to solve an interval of problems of length 1 is given by7
c(α;t)=t − α. (1)
Note that (1) implies log supermodularity of the cost of knowledge acquisition c(α;t)z in
ability α and knowledge z, as required for comparative advantage: high ability types have
7The linearity of the learning cost function c(·) in α and the limitation of the support to [0,1] is without
loss of generality, since we can always scale α to ﬁt these restrictions.
6a comparative advantage in knowledge acquisition (Sattinger, 1975, and Teulings, 1995).
Ad e c r e a s ei nt represents an improvement in information technology that decreases the
cost of learning (i.e., a technology that decreases the cost of accessing knowledge, such as
cheaper data-base storage and search).
2.2 Communication and Organization
Agents can communicate their knowledge to others, and thus help them solve problems. The
possibility of oﬀering help to others allows agents to form organizations in which several
individuals combine their time and knowledge to produce together. These organizations take
the form of ‘knowledge-based hierarchies.’ On the lowest layer of these teams is a set of
equally knowledgeable production workers, who learn the most routine problems and spend
all of their time in production, and thus generate one problem per worker. Above them are
one or multiple layers of managers, or specialized problem solvers, who in addition learn
the exceptions (the less frequent problems). These managers do not engage in production,
and thus do not draw problems. Production then proceeds as follows. Workers draw a
problem per unit of time. If they can solve it, they produce; otherwise, they ask for help
to the managers in the layer immediately above them, in which case these managers incur
a communication cost of h<1 units of time.8 If these managers know how to solve the
problem they solve it; otherwise, they pass it on to the layer immediately above them, and
so on, until the problem is solved or it reaches the highest layer in the organization, L.
Teams have a pyramidal structure: each higherl a y e rh a sas m a l l e rn u m b e ro fa g e n t st h a n
the previous one, since only a fraction of problems are passed on.9
Thus the organization of production is characterized by (i) agents specialized in pro-
duction or in management; (ii) production workers learn the more common problems and
problem solvers learn in addition exceptions, more exceptional the higher up the hierarchy;
(iii) a sequential path of the problems up the hierarchy; and (iv) a pyramidal shape. All
these characteristics are optimal under the assumption that agents do not know who may
8If h ≥ 1 organization is never optimal and so all agents prefer to be self-employed. We assume (as in
Garicano 2000) that this cost h results whether those asked know the answer to the problem themselves or
not, since the communication and diagnosis must still take place.
9Note that we assume that no substantial heterogeneity exists in communication skills among workers.
Although it could be that those with better cognitive ability are better able to communicate, it could also be
that these two variables are related in other, more complicated, ways. If communication cost are a decreasing
function of the ability of individuals, the comparative advantage of high skill agents in management will be
further emphasized and we would expect the equilibrium allocation to exhibit similar qualitatively properties
as in our framework. A more general study of the relation between learning costs and communication costs
is worth pursuing, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
7know the solution to problems they cannot solve, as Garicano (2000) shows in a model
with homogeneous workers.10 The purpose of the hierarchy is to protect the knowledge of
those who are more knowledgeable from easy questions that others can solve. If it were,
instead, easy to diagnose and ‘label’ a problem that one does not know, then production
workers would directly go with their unsolved problem to those with the exact specialized
knowledge, and the organization would not be hierarchical, but there would be instead a
one-to-one correspondence between problems solved and skill type.
Consider an organization with n0 production workers with knowledge q0 = F(z0); and
nl problem solving managers in layers l =1 ,...L,with knowledge ql. Workers in production
draw one problem each, and solve in expectation a fraction q0 of them. Hence they pass on
af r a c t i o n(1 − q0) of all problems. Managers in layer 1 are thus asked to solve n0 (1 − q0)
problems, which they can address in n0 (1 − q0)h units of time. Optimally, managers join
teams with precisely the right number of production workers so that they use all their
time. Since all agents have one unit of time available, the number of managers in layer 1
is n0h(1 − q0)=n1. The time constraint implies that the span of the manager is limited
by the knowledge of their subordinates. If subordinates acquire more knowledge, they will
require help less often, and managers will be able to supervise larger teams.11
Managers in layer 1 can only solve a fraction q1 of problems, and so pass up to the next
layer n0(1−q1) problems. Thus the number of managers in layer 2 is given by n0h(1−q1)=
n2. In general, managers of layer l are asked n0 (1 − ql−1) times, since they are asked for
help on all the problems that managers in layer l − 1 where not able to solve. Hence, the
number of managers in layer l satisﬁes
n0h(1 − ql−1)=nl.
Note that, as we pointed out before, the organization is pyramidal, n0 >n 1 >. . .>n L.
Output is produced whenever any of the managers or workers can solve the problem, that is,
10Garicano (2000) studies the organization of a single team composed of homogeneous workers and studies
under what conditions a ‘knowledge based hierarchy,’ is optimal. In contrast to this paper, that paper is
neither concerned with the equilibrium matches among agents, nor is it concerned with wages.
11Of course all of this holds in expectation. In principle, the interpretation of our technology given in the
text requires us to address the stochastic element in the arrival of problems, which could result in congestion
and queuing. An alternative interpretation, that circumvents the need to address these issues, is that each
worker draws a continuum of problems of measure one with distribution F (·). Workers then solve the
problems that they can, given their skill level, and ask managers for help on the rest. Then, h would be
interpreted as the time cost for a manager of helping on a unit mass of problems. Output of a production
worker, in turn, would be the mass of problems solved. We do not use this lenguage in the text since it leads
to a more convoluted exposition.
8a problem is solved with probability qL. Expected total output produced by the organization
is then given by
y = qLn0. (2)
Note the source of complementarity between skills in our model: An able top managers
increases the productivity of all workers in the team. The more knowledgeable subordinates,
the larger the team and the more can managers leverage their knowledge.12
2.3 Agents’ Problem
Agents are income maximizers. Their problem is to choose their occupation to maximize
income, given the available job opportunities. Available jobs are indexed by α0.Aj o b α0
pays a wage plus learning costs given by w(α0)+c(α0;t)z(q(α0)) and requires agents to know
h o wt os o l v eap r o p o r t i o nq(α0) of problems. The problem of an agent with ability α is to













Therefore, agents can either work for jobs designed for their ability α or for jobs designed
for diﬀerent abilities α0.T h eﬁrst order condition yields
w0 (α∗)=−c0(α∗;t)z(q(α∗)) − z0(q(α∗))q0 (α∗)(c(α∗;t) − c(α;t))
Notice that w0 (α∗)=−c0(α∗;t)z(q(α∗)) when α∗ = α which, as we show below, is the case
in equilibrium. Hence, the slope of the wage function is equal to the decrease in learning
costs as ability increases. We turn now to the problem of a team, which will allow us to
establish that agents have incentives to choose the job designed for their own ability.
2.4 Firms’ Problem
In this section we assume that a hierarchy is integrated in a ﬁrm, and study the problem of
a ﬁrm with a given number of layers. In Section 3, we will determine the diﬀerent number
of layers of the universe of hierarchies that operate in equilibrium. Proﬁts of a hierarchy
are given by production minus labor costs, since we normalize the price of output to unity.
Thus, the problem ofah i e r a r c h yo fL layers that faces a wage schedule, w(α),i st oc h o o s e
12Given this technology, note that in order for agents to organize in hierarchies it must be the case that
h<1. Production in a two layer hierarchy is given by qm/h(1 − qp). However, if these agents work on their
own they get qm + qp/h(1 − qp). The second term is larger than the ﬁrst one if h ≥ 1.
9the ability, knowledge, and number of agents in each layer of the team. The expected proﬁt
of the hierarchy is then given by







subject to time constraints of the diﬀerent layers of managers,




That is, proﬁts are given by output minus wages, w(α), and learning costs, nlclz(ql). We
call the manager in the highest layer an entrepreneur, and normalize their number, nL,t o
1.13 The choice of the ability of subordinates leads to one immediate result. The ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to αl yield
w0 (α)=−c0(α;t)z(q). (6)
This implies that in equilibrium wages will be such that agents choose the job designed for
their own ability and so in equilibrium the solution to (3) is α∗ = α. Hence, in equilibrium
the slope of the wage function is given by (6). Thus, we ignore this optimization for the
rest of this section and eliminate the choice of α from the notation. We come back to it
when we discuss the equilibrium allocation of this economy.
In the next section, and before moving to characterizing the equilibrium, we reformu-
late and study the maximization problem of the ﬁrm. This will allow us to substantially
simplify the equilibrium characterization, and will also allow us to interpret the knowledge
transactions in equilibrium, not only as taking place within ﬁrms, but also in referral or
consulting markets.
2.5 Knowledge Transactions
In this section we formulate (4) in a convenient recursive form. The objective is to show that
the decision making process in the hierarchy can be decentralized by allowing intermediate
managers to make decisions about the knowledge of their subordinates. This will allow us
13Since there is no interaction between agents in the same layer of a given hierarchy, this normalization is
without loss of generality.
10to understand knowledge transactions and the role of wage diﬀerences within the hierarchy.
Wages in this economy allocate agents to teams and encourage them to perform a suitable
role in the team. In this sense we can think about wages as compensating members of the
team not only for the problems that they actually solve, but also for passing problems to
the upper layers.
F i r s tn o t et h a tt h et o t a lf r a c t i o no fp r o b l e m ss o l v e db yt h eh i e r a r c h yi st h es u mo ft h e
fraction of problems solved at each layer, namely,
qL =[ qL − qL−1]+qL−1 =[ qL − qL−1]+[ qL−1 − qL−2]+... +[ q1 − q0]+q0. (7)
Hence, we can re-write (4) as
















Second, note that by the constraints in (5), nl/n0 = h(1 − ql−1), and recall that n0 =
1/h(1 − qL−1). Hence, we can write the maximization problem as
Π(L)= m a x qL−1,qL
1
h(1−qL−1) {(qL − qL−1) − h(1 − qL−1)(c(αL;t)z(qL)+w(αL))+
+max qL−2 {[(qL−1 − qL−2) − h(1 − qL−2)(c(αL−1;t)z(qL−1)+w(αL−1))] +
+max qL−3 {[(qL−2 − qL−3) − h(1 − qL−3)(c(αL−2;t)z(qL−2)+w(αL−2))] +
. . .
+max q0 {[(q1 − q0) − h(1 − q0)(c(α1;t)z(q1)+w(α1))] +
+[ q0 − (c(α0;t)z(q0)+w(α0))]}...}}},
which allows us to deﬁne, starting from the last term in the previous equation,
p(q0,w) ≡ q0 − (c(α0;t)z(q0)+w(α0)), (9)
and for the one before the last term,
p(q1;w) ≡ max
q0
[q1 − q0 − h(1 − q0)(c(α1;t)z(q1)+w(α1))] + p0(q0,w) (10)
and, generically for all intermediate layers, l =1 ,...,L− 1,
p(ql;w) ≡ max
ql−1
[ql − ql−1 − h(1 − ql−1)[c(αl;t)z(ql)+w(αl)] + p(ql−1;w)]. (11)
The overall proﬁt maximization of the ﬁrm is then given by
Π(L) ≡ max
qL,qL−1
qL − qL−1 − h(1 − qL−1)[c(αL;t)z(qL)+w(αL)] + p(qL−1;w)
h(1 − qL−1)




























> 0, for l =0 ,...,L− 2, (14)
where the inequality follows from the fact that wages and learning costs cannot exceed the
maximum gain from solving a problem, which is equal to 1. Notice that using (11) these














Finally, equation (11) leads to the following envelope conditions
p0 (q∗
l ;·)=1− h(1 − q∗
l−1)c(αl;t)z0(q∗
l ), for l =1 ,...,L− 1. (16)





l ;·) by combining conditions (16) and (17) with (14) generates an Euler
equation that can be readily interpreted: the marginal cost of an increase in the knowledge of
layer l workers must equal the gain (as given by the saving in wages and training) associated
with reducing the number of managers in the layer l +1when less questions are asked.
These conditions fully characterize the solution to this problem. To interpret them note















This suggests a ready interpretation for the function p. It is the fee or transfer that
managers receive from lower level managers or workers to deal with the problems that they
cannot solve. We will show that in equilibrium this fee is negative. The wage structure of
a ﬁrm can thus be interpreted as a transfer system in which managers pay workers a fee
to pass problem to them and managers keep the output associated with the problems that
12they solve. In turn these managers receive fees from the managers above them for passing
the problems that they cannot solve.
The earnings of a particular manager, w(αl),f o re a c ho ft h e1/h problems she can deal
with, are given by the conditional probability that she can solve the problem given that







l−1), plus the (negative) conditional





, minus the (negative)
conditional fee that she pays to pass the problem to a higher layer, p(q∗
l ;·), minus her
training costs.
The above conditions suggest the following way to write the problem, which in fact can
be shown to be equivalent. Suppose each manager chooses her knowledge and the knowledge
of those below her sequentially, so
w(αl)= m a x
ql,ql−1
∙





Since workers do not have subordinates, let them choose only their own knowledge to
maximize their income, namely,
w(α0)=m a x
q0
[q0 − p(q0;·) − c(α0;t)z(q0)]. (20)
Finally, top managers do not pass problems to higher layers. If we deﬁne p(q∗
L;·) as the
transfer that entrepreneurs would have to pay to pass a problem to a higher layer, it must
b et h ec a s et h a t
p(q∗
L;·) ≥ 0. (21)
Otherwise they would prefer to pass the problem further. Hence, their earning are given by
w(αL)= m a x
qL,qL−1
∙





It is easy to check that the problem in (19 — 22) is equivalent to the problem in (4) if we
impose zero proﬁts (Π(L)=0 ). It is also easy to check that the ﬁrst order conditions
of problem (19) are the same as the ﬁrst order conditions (12 — 14) plus the envelope
conditions (16). Hence using this transfer function we can interpret the problem as one in
which agents choose sequentially their knowledge and the knowledge of those below them
so as to maximize their own earnings.
In fact, these transfers can be interpreted as prices and so the problem above can be
understood as one in which knowledge transactions take place in the market instead of
within ﬁrms. In particular, as the next section points out, we can think either about
13agents selling the problems that they cannot solve, as in the case of referrals, or agents
hiring consultants to ask them the solution to problems for which they do not have enough
knowledge. We now turn to a description of these markets and show that they are simply
reinterpretations of the knowledge transactions within ﬁrms described above.
2.6 Alternative Formulations: Knowledge Transactions in the Market
Referrals and the market for problems: Consider now a market in which there are
two types of occupations: production workers and problem solvers. Production workers with
skill α0 draw a problem per unit of time and use their knowledge q0 to try to solve it. If
they can solve the problem, they do so and earn 1; if they cannot solve it, they sell it in the
market at a price ˜ p(q0). They incur a training cost c(α0;t)z(q0). Their choice of knowledge
is the solution to their earning maximization problem, as given by
w(α0)=m a x
q0
q0 +˜ p(q0)(1 − q0) − c(α0;t)z(q0).
There are (possibly) multiple layers of problem solvers, l =1 ,...L.Problem solvers in layer 1
buy problems from the pool of problems left unsolved by production workers at price (˜ p(q0)).
These problems are communicated to them at a cost of h units of time per problem. Problem
solvers of layer 2 buy problems from the pool of problems left unsolved by those in layer 1
at a price p(q1), and so on. In general, the earnings of these problem solvers are given by










for l =1 ,...,L,w h e r e˜ p(ql) ≤ 0 for those problem solvers who do not sell the problems
further in equilibrium. Problem solvers at layer l can deal with 1/h problems per unit
of time; they buy problems from agents with knowledge ql−1 and solve it with probability
(ql−ql−1)/(1−ql−1). If they cannot solve them (which happens with probability (1−ql)/(1−
ql−1)), they sell them at a price ˜ p(ql). They unconditionally pay ˜ p(ql−1) for each problem
they get from the lower layer problem solvers.





where w denotes the equilibrium wage function. To see that the problem is the same,
substitute (23) in equation (20) and in equation (19).
This type of institution, where agents sell problems to other agents in exchange for a
‘referral’ fee, is often observed empirically. One example is the market for legal claims. In
14this market, when a lawyer faces a client whose case she cannot solve, she refers that client
to another lawyer in exchange for a fee.14
The market of consultant services: Consider a second alternative market institution.
Production workers draw a problem per unit of time, and keep ownership of the production
associated with solving the problem (rather than selling it when they do not know how to
solve it); they pay a fee per problem to other agents for their advice. If production workers
know the solution to the problem, they solve it; if not, they pay a fee ˆ p(q1) to the problem
solvers in layer 1. If these cannot solve them, then they pay a fee to problem solvers in
layer 2, and so on. Workers earnings are then given by
w(α0)= m a x
{ql}L
l=0
qL − c(α0;t)z(q0) −
L X
l=1
(1 − ql−1)ˆ p(ql). (24)
So workers’ earnings are given by the probability that the problem is ultimately solved,
minus the training costs, and minus the expected consulting fees paid (given by the proba-
bility that a given consultant l is hired times the consulting fee of that consultant, ˆ p(ql)).
Consultant earnings are the expected consulting fee earned, as given by the fee per service
times the expected number of services they can provide (given that each one requires h






Again, this is just a reinterpretation of the setup in the previous section if we let
ˆ p(ql)=
























where as before w represent the equilibrium wage function. It is easy to check that substi-
tuting (26) and (27) in (25) and (24), we again obtain (19).
This type of institution, where agents pay others a consulting fee, are prevalent in
medicine and consulting services for ﬁrms. An agent goes to the doctor, pays for advice,
and receives a treatment. If the treatment is not the right solution the patient goes to
another, more expensive and knowledgeable, doctor and so on.
14See Spurr (1988). Garicano and Santos (2004) analyze a referral market under asymmetric information.
153 Equilibrium
The previous analysis has allowed us to obtain, for a given hierarchy, the proportion of tasks
each agent should learn to perform, as well as team sizes, given wages. We now turn to the
analysis of an equilibrium in this economy. An equilibrium allocation speciﬁes the sets of
agents in diﬀerent occupations, an assignment of agents to their supervisors, and the wage
schedule (or other prices in the diﬀerent decentralizations) that supports this assignment.15
Before we deﬁne a competitive equilibrium for this economy we need to discuss the labor
market equilibrium condition. In order for labor markets to clear we need to guarantee that
the supply of workers or managers for any measurable set of abilities at a given layer is equal
to the demand for these workers or managers by managers or entrepreneurs at any layer.
Let n(α) denote the total number of workers or managers hired as direct subordinates of
managers or entrepreneurs with ability α in equilibrium. Let a(α) denote the ability of
the manager assigned to an employee of ability α in equilibrium. In order for a(α) to be
deﬁned over the whole set of abilities, [0,1],w es e ta(α)=1for all entrepreneurs. Since
hierarchies have only one entrepreneur at the top n(a(α)) = 1 when agents with ability α
are entrepreneurs.16 Let AS be the set of agents with subordinates and let AM denote the
set of agents that are not at the top of the hierarchy (all agents that have a manager or









The left hand side is the supply of employees in the interval [0,α] (the integral of population
density over the set of workers and managers, [0,α] ∩ AM). The right hand side is the
demand for employees by managers and entrepreneurs in the interval [a(0),a(α)]:M a n a g e r s
and entrepreneurs of ability α hire n(α) employees and there are n(a(α)) of them. The
deﬁnition of equilibrium in this setup is then given by:
15Note that the problem we confront is diﬀerent from Sattinger (1993) and Teulings (1995) (and all other)
canonical (‘Ricardian’) assignment problems. First, rather than matching one worker and one machine, we
match here one manager and any number of subordinates (see Fernández and Galí (1999) for an example
with borrowing constraints). Second, our economy must not assign given machines to given workers; we
have instead to determine which agents are going to be managers, at what layer, and which ones are going
to be production workers. Third, the interaction between manager skill and subordinate skill is not direct,
but takes place through team size and the knowledge acquired.
16Given that the best agent in the economy, α =1 , may hire more than 1 worker, this implies that n(1)
is in general not single-valued.
17T h ei n t e g r a l si nt h i se q u a t i o na r en o ts i m p l yo v e rt h es e t s[0,α] and [a(0),a(α)] s i n c ew eh a v en o t
proven yet that the set of workers, managers, and entrepreneurs are connected. In Proposition 4 we prove
that this has to be the case in equilibrium.
16Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium is
• the set of numbers of layers of hierarchies operating, ¯ L,w h e r eL ∈ ¯ L is the number of
layers of the highest hierarchy,
• ac o l l e c t i o no fs e t s{Al = AlM ∪ AlE}
L
l=0 such that for α ∈ AlM agents become man-
agers of layer l, l =1 ,...,L,or workers for α ∈ A0M, and entrepreneurs of layer l for
α ∈ AlE,l=0 ,...,L,
• aw a g ef u n c t i o n ,w(α):[ 0 ,1] → R+,





• a knowledge function q(α):[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] and
• a total number of direct subordinates of agents with ability α, n(α):AS → R+,s u c h
that:
(i) Agents choose occupations to maximize utility, (3).
(ii) Firms choose the skill of their employees, their knowledge, and spans of control so as
to maximize proﬁts, (4).
(iii) Firms make zero proﬁts and so p(q(α);·) ≥ 0, for α ∈ AlE ,l=0 ,...,L,w h e r ep(·)
is given by (11) and (21).





We now turn to the characterization of the assignment function. An important characteristic
of the equilibrium assignment is that it exhibits positive sorting, in the sense that better
managers are matched with better employees. That is, the assignment function is strictly
increasing for α ∈ AM.18 This is the result of the complementarity in production between
the knowledge of team members. To see this, recall that the output of a given manager, as
given by the production component in (18), is ql − ql−1/(h(1 − ql−1)). Better subordinates
18We will talk about workers, managers and entrepreneurs for simplicity; clearly, these are measure 0
atoms in a continuous distribution. The only appropriate way to think about them are masses of workers
and managers at given intervals. The reader should thus not read from the existence of the assignment
function that agents are matched one to one.
17allow for an increase in the size of the team, while a larger team size increases the marginal
value of managerial knowledge.19
Proposition 1 Any equilibrium of this economy involves positive sorting.
High ability managers hire high ability agents so as to be shielded from solving easy and
common problems. Hiring better workers allows managers to specialize in solving only the
harder problems that lower layer agents cannot solve. With this result in hand, deriving








for α ∈ AM. (29)






1 − q(a−1 (α))
for α ∈ AM\A0M,
where a−1 (·) denotes the inverse of the assignment function a(·),a n d
n(a(a(α)))
n(a(α))
= h(1 − q(α)) for α ∈ A0M.







φ(a(α)) for α ∈ AM\A0M
h(1 − q(α))
φ(α)
φ(a(α)) for α ∈ A0M
. (30)
Intuitively, suppose that we are assigning managers to workers. Then, the number of
managers per subordinate that results from the ﬁrm optimization, over the ratio of available
agents with the corresponding ability (given by the skill distribution), determines the slope
of the assignment function. Equation (30) is a collection of ordinary diﬀerential equations
that determine the functions a(·) given some initial values. Assume for the moment that the
equilibrium is formed by a collection of connected sets, {Al = AlM ∪ AlE}
L
l=0 , characterized






l=0,w i t hα∗













and ALE =[ α∗
LL,1]. That is, a threshold α∗
ij determines
the boundary in the ability set between layer i and j when i 6= j, and between the set of
managers and entrepreneurs when i = j (see Figure 1). Diﬀerent collections of sets may, in
19Note that it may be the case that multiple workers choose to acquire zero knowledge. In that case
the assignment is indeterminate since managers only care about the amount and cost of knowledge of their
workers and not their ability. In this case, given that the assignment of these workers is irrelevant for any
other feature of an equilibrium, we always choose the assignment that exhibits positive sorting.
18principle, be an equilibrium too, however, we prove below that the unique equilibrium of this
economy has this form. Given this segmentation of skills into occupations, the boundary








Therefore, we have written the problem in a way that allows us to determine the equilibrium
assignment function if we can determine the knowledge function q(·) and the boundaries







Figure 1 illustrates the way the assignment function matches individuals in a hierarchy.
It present an example where the economy has a maximum of three layers (L =2 )w i t h
entrepreneurs in layer 1 and 2 (that is, the set of entrepreneurs is connected, as we show
b e l o w ) .T h ea r r o w sa tt h et o po ft h el i n er e p r e s e n tt h ea s s i g n m e n tf o rt h eh i e r a r c h yt h a t
hires the worst workers in the economy, which are matched with the worst managers of layer
1, which in turn are matched with the worst entrepreneurs of layer 2 (a hierarchy with 3
layers). The arrows below the line illustrate the assignment in the hierarchy that hires the
best workers, which are matched with the best entrepreneurs of layer 1 (a hierarchy with 2
layers).
0  Ability  *
01
*





12 α α = 1
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23 = α






Figure 1: Assignments in equilibrium
3.2 Wages
We now turn to analyze the equilibrium wage schedule. The ﬁrst characteristic of the wage
function is that it is continuous with respect to ability, although in general not diﬀerentiable
at every skill level. Continuity is the result of the agent’s utility maximization problem
and the labor market equilibrium condition. To see this note that if the wage function
is not continuous, the problem in (3) implies that a strictly positive mass of agents with
heterogenous skill will choose to work in a job that requires a particular skill level (a corner
solution). This is, however, not consistent with the labor market equilibrium condition that
requires these agents to work for managers with diﬀerent skills (the assignment function








The slope of the wage function is given, as we argued above, by (6), namely,
w0 (α)=−c0(α;t)z(q(α)) = z(q(α)) > 0,
where the second equality follows from c0(α;t)=−1 < 0 and the inequality from z (·) > 0.
Thus, since the wage function is continuous, it is increasing. In words, the marginal return
to skill is the marginal value of agents skill, which is given by the knowledge the agent
acquires. This equation contains a lot of the intuition for what follows. More inequality
will result in equilibrium whenever a technology change leads agents to learn more tasks,
as then the diﬀerence between more and less skilled agents becomes more pronounced.
The wage function is also convex. To see this note that for all α where w(·) is diﬀeren-








The ﬁrst term is positive given that z0 (·) > 0. We still need to show that more skilled agents
learn more, so q0 (α) > 0. In Proposition 1 we showed that this is in fact the case under
our assumption that z00 (·) > 0. Of course, the above argument only shows that the wage
function is convex within occupations, given that the wage function is not diﬀerentiable at
the thresholds (since q is not continuous at the thresholds). To show that it is globally convex
we need to show that at the thresholds between occupations the slope of the wage function
increases, or the knowledge function increases (in general discreetly). In Proposition 1
we show that this must be the case in order for the labor market clearing condition to
be satisﬁed. Thus, in our setup wages compensate ability more than proportionally. We
formalize this reasoning in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Any equilibrium wage function, w(α):[ 0 ,1] → R+, is increasing and con-
vex. Furthermore, the knowledge function q(α):[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is increasing.
It is illustrative to compare the equilibrium wage schedule, and the underlying knowl-
edge acquisition, to the one that would result in equilibrium absent organization — that
is, when all agents are self-employed (e.g., h ≥ 1). The following proposition shows that
organization reduces the knowledge of production workers and increases the knowledge of
high level problem solvers. Production workers acquire less knowledge than they would ab-
sent organization, since they substitute learning for asking. As a consequence, the marginal
20return to worker skill (6) is lower than with self-employment. For the highest level problem
solvers, the marginal value of their knowledge is higher than in self-employment, since they
can spread such knowledge over a larger team.
Proposition 3 Relative to an economy without organization, organization increases the
knowledge of entrepreneurs and decreases the knowledge of production workers. As a result
organization decreases the marginal value of worker skill and increases the marginal value
of the entrepreneur’s skill.
For those agents in between the top and the bottom, there are two eﬀects — they can
ask for help, which reduces the value of knowledge, and they can answer questions, which
increases it. The proposition above thus shows that organization accentuates ability diﬀer-
entials among the best and worse individuals.
3.3 Occupational Stratiﬁcation
In equilibrium occupations are stratiﬁed by ability. The lowest skilled agents are workers,
the next set of agents are managers of layer one, then entrepreneurs of layer one, and so on
for other layers. That is, agents in the economy are segmented by cognitive skill.
First notice that by equation (14), p0 (q(α);·) > 0 for all α<a −1 (1) and by condition
(21) and Proposition 1, p(q(α);·) ≥ 0 for all α ≥ a−1 (1). That is, the fee paid for
transferring problems to the managers above should be non-negative for all agents that are
at the top of hierarchies (do not ask questions) in equilibrium. This implies, since q is an
increasing function of α, as shown in Proposition 2, that the fee for passing problems is
negative for all α<a −1 (1). Managers, in eﬀect, pay workers to pass problems to them.
Since p is an increasing function of q, which is an increasing function of α,t h i si m p l i e s
that the set of agents without supervisors (entrepreneurs) has to be a connected set. Hence
the economy can only sustain ﬁrms with two diﬀerent but adjacent number of layers, ¯ L =
{L − 1,L}.
The occupational stratiﬁcation by ability is also present among diﬀerent layers of man-
agers and managers and workers. In particular, the worse agents will be workers, and better
agents will be managers of higher layers, and the higher the ability the weakly higher the
layer. The result is again the outcome of q(α) b e i n gi n c r e a s i n gi nα and the fact that it is
never optimal for a ﬁrm to hire subordinates of a manager with more or the same knowl-
edge than the manager. To understand this last statement note that forming a team with
subordinates with the same ability is always suboptimal and so agents prefer to be on their
21own. The wage of an entrepreneur of a ﬁrm with L layers is given by (22), which is positive
if there are ﬁrms in operation that have L layers. If this entrepreneur instead of choosing
optimally the knowledge of her subordinates were to choose a subordinate in layer L − 1
with her same knowledge, qL−1 = qL, her wage would be smaller than −c(αL;t)z(qL) since
p(qL;·) ≥ 0. Earnings become even more negative if qL−1 >q L. A parallel argument goes
through for intermediate managers.
Proposition 4 Any equilibrium allocation with a maximum number of L ≥ 0 layers is




















managers of layers 1 to L − 1, and [0,α ∗
00] are workers. Hence, α∗
ll = α∗
ll+1 for all l =
0,...,L− 2, and α∗
L−1L = α∗
LL.
Note that this ‘stratiﬁcation’ result holds independently of the skill distribution. This
is in contrast with the general class of production functions with complementarities and
asymmetric skill sensitivity, where whether such strong stratiﬁcation of occupations by skill
takes place depends on the distribution of skill in the population, as Kremer and Maskin
(1997) and Legros and Newman (2002) show. Intuitively, for the production technology we
study, if it does not pay for an agent to pass problems, it does not pay for more able agents to
pass even harder problems. Conversely, if an agent is worth helping, because the problems
she cannot solve are suﬃciently valuable, then all agents who are less knowledgeable than
her are also worth helping.
3.4 Existence, Uniqueness, and Optimality
An equilibrium of this economy exists and is unique. Before we present this result, it is
useful to outline the algorithm to ﬁnd the equilibrium in this economy. An equilibrium can
be constructed as follows:
1. Set L =1and ﬁx 0 <α 1
00 <α 1
01 < 1 and w(0).




00 =m i n
"(
α :l i m
α↑α1
00








224. Let the supply of workers accumulated in the interval [0,α ∗




















Note that, since we are using (29) to calculate assignments, condition (28) is satisﬁed
in the interior of these intervals. Find w(0) such that




01 =m i n
∙½
α :l i m
α↑α∗
01








6. If 0 <α ∗
00 <α ∗
01 < 1,t h e np(α∗
00;w)=0and we have found an equilibrium with
L =1layers. If α∗
01 =1and so α∗
00 =0 , we found an equilibrium and the equilibrium
number of layers is L =0 .I f α∗
00 = α∗
01 then the equilibrium number of layers L is
larger than 1. Go to step 1. and repeat the algorithm with L =2 .
Figure 2 presents a diagram of an equilibrium wage function with the diﬀerent thresh-





LL,1) the wage function is not diﬀerentiable since the amount of knowledge ac-
quired changes discontinuously. In the example illustrated in the ﬁgure, the economy has a
maximum of three layers {0,1,L=2 }, and so there are no entrepreneurs of layer 0 and no




LL,a n ds o¯ L = {1,2}).
The next proposition shows that there exists an equilibrium with the characteristics
described above. The proof of existence is constructive and so it develops in detailed the
algorithm described above.20
Proposition 5 There exists a unique equilibrium allocation.
20As noted in the proof of Proposition 1 it may be the case that multiple workers decide to acquire zero
knowledge. In that case the equilibrium allocation is unique up to the choice of the assignment of these
workers to managers.
23So far we have studied the model without reference to the eﬃciency properties of the
equilibrium allocation. The equilibrium allocation is eﬃc i e n t .T h el o g i cb e h i n dt h er e s u l t
is that the total time endowment of agents is used in production, and the problems that are
not eventually solved would be more costly to solve than the beneﬁts that agents may derive
from solving them (and therefore p(·) ≥ 0). Moreover, even though the technology exhibits
complementarity between worker skills, all the interactions between agents are priced either
through wages within hierarchies or in the market with problem prices. Hence, the First
Welfare Theorem applies and the equilibrium allocation is Pareto Optimal. In the proof of
the next proposition we set up the social planner problem and show that it is solved by the
equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
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Figure 2: Construction of an equilibrium allocation
4E ﬀect of IT on wages and organization
To illustrate the qualitative predictions of the theory and advance the characterization of an
equilibrium allocation, we compute several numerical examples. We will use these examples
to explain the general equilibrium eﬀects of both types of technological changes in our
theory.
We study an example with an exponential density of problems, f(z)=e−λz and a
uniform distribution of worker talent, α ∼ U[0,1]. Moreover, we let λ =2in all exercises.
24Figure 3 presents the results of this numerical simulation.



















































































































































































































































Entrepreneurs l = 1
Entrepreneurs l = 2
Figure 3: Numerical examples
The six graphs presented in Figure 3 show the equilibrium wage and knowledge of all
25agents for diﬀerent parameter values. The ﬁgures in the ﬁrst row present the earnings and
knowledge function for h =0 .98,a n dt =1 .9 and 1.1 respectively. The second row presents
t h es a m eg r a p h sw h e nw el o w e rt h ev a l u eo fh to 0.8 for the same values of t,a n dt h e
third row when we lower h further to h =0 .7. The parameter values have been chosen
to maximize visibility. Table 1 may also be useful to understand the numerical results
presented in Figure 3 and described in the next two subsections. Note that when t =1 .9
workers do not acquire knowledge since it is cheaper to ask about all problems than to learn.
Therefore, in this case all workers earn the same in equilibrium.
There are several features of the equilibrium we have described above that are apparent
in all the simulations presented. Wages are increasing and convex, higher ability agents
learn more, there is positive sorting, and the set of entrepreneurs is connected. All of these
are general results in our model and so should be present in all simulations. We now turn
to the description of the eﬀect of changes in communication and information technology.





























Q of highest ability worker
h\t 1.91 .1
0.98 00 . 9 5
0.8 00 . 8 0
0.7 00 . 7 8
4.1 Reduction in Communication Cost
Organization: A reduction in communication cost (h) increases the value of organization
— the cost of asking others for help decreases relative to the cost of acquiring knowledge.
As a result, as we move down the panels in Figure 3 from the highest possible cost of
communication (recall that organization requires h<1, thus we start from .98),t h en u m b e r
of layers of management increases and the proportion of workers who are self-employed
decreases. The panels present two cases. In the left hand ﬁgures, the cost of acquiring
knowledge is high (high t), so production workers acquire no knowledge and always ask
higher level workers for help; in the right hand set of ﬁgures (low t), the organizational
pattern is similar, but workers always acquire some knowledge.
26Knowledge: Increasing reliance on organization implies that the maximum knowledge
acquired by production workers decreases with h (Proposition 3) — they ask more questions
and use their own knowledge less. In contrast, the knowledge acquired by entrepreneurs
increases — as communication costs goes down, spans of control increase and managers
leverage more their knowledge, raising the marginal value of learning. Overall, lower com-
munication costs imply more centralization — more problems are solved at the top of the
hierarchy relative to the bottom.
Inequality: Lower communication costs serve as an equalizer within production work-
ers. Since workers acquire less knowledge the diﬀerences in skill translate (by equation (6))
in smaller diﬀerences in wages. On the other hand, inequality between layers and within
entrepreneurs increases. Since entrepreneurs and managers acquire more knowledge, diﬀer-
ences in skill among them translate into larger diﬀerences in wages — organization ampliﬁes
diﬀerences in skill among them. These two eﬀects are specially clear in Table 1 for the
case of t =1 .1.21 Hence, decreases in h reduce within worker wage inequality and increase
within manager wage inequality. Looking at overall wage inequality, the ﬁrst eﬀect domi-
nates for high levels of h and the second for low levels — total wage inequality, measured by
the standard deviation of wages, ﬁrst decreases and then increases as we decrease h.N o t e
that the wage of the lowest ability agent increases as communication costs fall, since the
higher span of control results in higher demand for workers.
4.2 Reduction in the cost of acquiring knowledge
Organization: A reduction in the cost of learning to solve problems makes learning less
costly relative to communication, and thus makes organization less attractive relative to
self-employment. As a result, the proportion of self-employed agents goes up, as we move
from the right to the left column of Figure 3. If communication costs are high these changes
also imply an increase in spans of control and a decrease in the number of layers as agents
learn more and rely less on communication.
Knowledge: Both workers and managers acquire more knowledge since learning costs
are lower. Thus the ‘knowledge-intensity’ of production jobs increases, and a larger propor-
tion of problems get solved at lower hierarchical levels — decentralization increases.
21For t =1 .9 workers do not learn, so there is no within group wage inequality. In fact, the decrease in
worker wage inequality, combined with the increase in manager/entrepreneur wage inequality may result in
some agents earning less after the improvement in communication costs. This is the case in Figure 4 when
t =1 .1 and communication costs go from 0.8 to 0.7. The example shows how there may be some losers as
technology improves!
27Inequality: As Figures 3 and 4 and Table 1 show, the general equilibrium impact of the
change is a substantial increase in wage inequality within groups. More knowledge acquired
means larger wage diﬀerentials, by equation (6). The increase in knowledge acquired is
higher at higher levels of the hierarchy, given the increase in leverage allowed by more
knowledgeable workers, and thus so is the increase in wage inequality. As a result, overall

























Figure 4: Equilibrium Wage Function
Overall, one of the interesting features of the model is the eﬀect on wages of increases in
managerial span. If a ﬁrm has many layers so that the highest layer entrepreneur manages
a ﬁrm with a large number of workers, she can leverage her knowledge immensely which
results in very high earnings. This eﬀect can be appreciated in the numerical exercise for
h =0 .7 and t =1 .1. This is the example in which we assume the best information and
communication technology. The result is an economy with three layers. There are very few
entrepreneurs of layer three. As can be observed in Figure 3, these entrepreneurs do not
learn much more than the managers or entrepreneurs of layer two, however, they earn much
more. The extent of this increase in wages can be appreciated in Figure 4, where we have
plotted the equilibrium wage functions for all the examples presented above.22
22As is evident in Figure 4, the wage of agents with ability α =0 ,w h e nt =1 .9, i n c r e a s e sa sw ei n c r e a s eh.
These workers cannot solve any problems, the increase in their wage reﬂects the fact that a higher fraction
of problems is solved and so the expected value of production increases. Since layer 0 workers are necessary
to produce, the increase in the expected value of production is reﬂe c t e di nt h e i rw a g e .I nr e a l i t y ,i ti sn o t
clear that the gains from a higher expected value of production are assigned to unskilled workers. This is
why we focus the analysis on the structure, and not the level, of the earnings function.
285U S E m p i r i c a l P a t t e r n s
The last 30 years have been characterized by large reductions in the cost of accessing and
communicating information. First, since the late 60’s, we have observed large decreases
in the cost of processing information, as observed for example in the steep decline of the
price of a transistor (down by several orders of magnitude, as captured by Moore’s law).
Second, more recently, large reductions in communication costs, particularly due to the
introduction and widespread adoption during the late 90’s of e-mail, cellular phones, and
wireless technology. Our model suggests that two diﬀerent patterns in the evolution of wages
and organization should follow from such exogenous technological changes. A reduction in
the cost of processing information (t), such as the one resulting from Moore’s law, leads to
an increase in the knowledge-content of all jobs and an increase in decentralization (as more
problems are solved by those closer to the production ﬂoor), a reduction in organization (as
self-employment increases), and an increase in wage inequality within worker and manager
categories. A reduction in the cost of communication (h), such as the one resulting from
wireless, e-mail and cellular phones, should reduce the knowledge content of production
jobs. This in turn should decrease wage inequality among workers but, by increasing the
importance of organization and the number of layers of management, increase inequality
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Mean Log Firm Size (FS)
10 x Standard Deviation of Log Hourly Wages (All Men, March, WI)
Source: Mean Log Firm Size :Compustat, SD of Log Hourly Wages: March CPS using the methodology in Card and DiNardo (2002).
Correlation (FS,WI) = -0.9502








1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Ratio of Average CEO Total Pay (Including Options Valued at Grant-Date) to
Average Annual Earnings of Production Workers
Source:  CEO sample is based on all CEOs included in the S&P 500, using data from Forbes and ExecuComp. CEO total pay includes cash pay, 
restricted stock, payouts from long-term pay programs, and the value of stock options granted using ExecuComp's modified Black-Scholes approach. 
(Total pay prior to 1978 excludes option grants, while total pay between 1978 and 1991 is computed using the amounts realized from exercising stock 
options during the year, rather than grant-date values.) Worker pay represents 52 times the average weekly hours of production workers multiplied by 
the average hourly earnings, based on data from the Current Employment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics. We thank Kevin Murphy for this data.
Figure 6: Worker-Manager Wage Inequality
We do indeed observe two diﬀerentiated patterns of changes in the evolution of wage
inequality in recent data. During the 80’s and early 90’s, there was a large increase in wage
inequality, mostly due to an increase in the demand for skill, and, more speciﬁcally, for
cognitive skills, and which appears to be correlated with the increasing use of information
29technology.23 Instead, since the second half of the 90’s, we observe a slow-down in the
generalized increase in wage inequality (see Figure 5), which is replaced by two diﬀerentiated
trends. While the inequality at the top as measured for example by the 90/50 wage gap,
continues to grow, inequality at the bottom (as given by the 50/10 wage gap) has stopped
growing or even declined (Murphy and Welch, 2001). A particularly striking version of this
pattern of increased inequality at the top is observed in the CEO/worker wage gap, which
has continued to increase substantially (see Figure 6).
In contrast, the existence of such diﬀerentiated patterns in the organization of work has
not been documented. The empirical literature has only documented changes in the internal
structure of hierarchy in the 80’s and early 90’s which are consistent with the comparative
statics that result from decreases in t: an increase in the autonomy and responsibility
of workers, a reduction of the number of layers of management, and an increase in the
managerial span of control. Again, these changes have been found to be associated with
the use of information technology.24 Our theory suggests that the impact of communication
technology during the last years of the 90’s and early 2000’s should lead organizations
towards increasing centralization, an equalization of routine jobs, and a reduction of self-
employment as hierarchies get larger through larger spans of control and more layers. There
are no systematic studies of the reorganization of the workplace for the late 90’s to which
we could contrast the predictions of our theory. Therefore, we oﬀer them as guidance for
future empirical work. However, Figure 5 provides some support for the hypothesis that the
trends in wage inequality are reﬂected in trends in organization. It presents the standard
23Katz and Murphy (1992) are the ﬁrst paper to show that increases in inequality are consistent with skill
biased technological change Later, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Troske
(1997) have shown that the composition of the labor force within industry and establishments continues
to shift towards the more educated workers and more skilled occupations, in spite of raises in returns to
skills. Evidence that a similar patter is seen in other countries is provided by Berman, Bound, and Machin
(1998) (see also the survey in Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005)). Murnane, Willet and Levy, (1995)
ﬁnd a higher correlation between earnings and test scores for a more recent panel of graduates than for
an earlier one. This ﬁnding is particularly clear for high test scores in math. It was Krueger (1993) who
ﬁrst documented a substantial premium associated with computer use, of up to half of the growth in the
education premium since the eighties. This ﬁnding was conﬁrmed later by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1997).
Lehr and Lichtenberg (1999) have found that larger computer purchases and skill are complementary.
24Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) ﬁnd, using ﬁrm-level data, that greater use of computers is
associated with the employment of more-educated workers, greater investments in training, broader job
responsibilities for line workers, and more decentralized decision-making. Caroli and Reenen (2001) ﬁnd
evidence of organizational change complementary with increases in demand for skills. In particular, they
ﬁnd evidence of decentralization of authority and a widening of the range of tasks performed by workers.
Rajan and Wulf (2003), in a recent paper, present evidence that from 1986 to 1995 ﬁrms have become
ﬂatter, with less layers of management and that managerial span of control has increased. The evidence
from 1995 to 1999 is weaker but suggests, as in our theory, that the ﬂattening stopped and managerial span
kept increasing.
30deviation of hourly wages together with the mean log ﬁrm size from 1976 to 2000 in the
US. The correlation between the two series is -0.95.25 This remarkable negative correlation
supports our view that there is a common source of variation driving changes in both of
them. Our interpretation is that the underlying source of variation is the costs of acquiring
and communicating information: improvements in the cost of accessing knowledge, mostly
concentrated in the 80’s and early 90’s but present throughout the period (e.g. Moore’s
Law), followed by improvements in communication technology in the late 90’s.26
The evidence above suggests that our theory may be capturing some of the eﬀects
of information technology on the labor market and the organization of work. Whether
it can capture the eﬀects of technological improvements in other periods and countries
is an open question that we leave for future research. A promising episode is, however,
the turn of the century in the US. This is another period of important improvements in
communication technology, in particular, the telegraph, railroads, and the telephone. The
evidence in Chandler (1977) seems to suggest that these technological improvements lead to
the creation of large enterprises with many layers of management: The modern American
ﬁrm. Evidence in Goldin and Katz (1995) seems to suggest that this was accompanied by
decreases in within worker wage inequality.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Paraphrasing Hayek, ‘the economic problem of society is to use optimally the available
knowledge.’ In this paper, we have taken a step towards understanding how economic
organization provides incentives for the acquisition and communication of knowledge, how
the rewards to cognitive skill depend on the organization of knowledge, and how these
rewards are aﬀected by changes in information technology. To do this, we have presented
an equilibrium theory of organization and earnings when production requires labor and
knowledge and workers are heterogeneous in their cognitive skill. The equilibrium obtained
is formed by a universe of knowledge-based hierarchies competing for workers and managers.
Among the salient features of the equilibrium are positive sorting, the stratiﬁcation of agent
skill into ranks, and the accentuation by organization of innate ability diﬀerentials between
25The correlation of ﬁrst diﬀerences is -0.48.
26T h ed a t ai nF i g u r e5i so nﬁrms, and not on hierarchies; recall that only the boundary of the hierarchy,
and not of the ﬁrm, is determined in our theory. As long as the determinants of the boundaries of the ﬁrm
are not aﬀected signiﬁcantly by changes in information technology, changes in the size of hierarchies result
in corresponding changes in the size of ﬁrms.
31the best and worse agents.
Our theory allows us to study the distinct impact of access to information and com-
munication technology. A decrease in the cost of access to stored knowledge leads teams
to want to increase worker’s knowledge about tasks and, as a result, allows for an increase
in managerial span and a reduction in managerial intervention in problem solving. If com-
munication costs are high, these eﬀects lead to a decrease in the number of layers which
further enhances the eﬀect on decentralization and reduces ﬁrm size. Wage inequality within
workers and within managers increases, as the marginal product of skill is proportional to
the knowledge acquired. In contrast, as communication technology improves, workers learn
less since it is cheaper to ask their managers. This reduction in worker’s knowledge re-
sults in small diﬀerences in worker wages and therefore less wage inequality among them.
Managers, in contrast, can deal with more subordinates therefore increasing their spans
of control, earnings, and inequality among them. Combined with taller hierarchies, these
changes result in larger hierarchies or ﬁrms.
The distinction between these two technological changes is relevant to interpret recent
qualitative trends in organization and inequality. More broadly, we show that to understand
the determinants of wage inequality it is necessary to understand the internal structure of
teams. Conversely, our analysis also shows that to understand changes in the organization
of production it is necessary to incorporate hierarchies to an equilibrium framework.
The theory has some limitations that should be noted here and, hopefully, will lead to
future work. First, our work focuses on heterogeneity and technological changes that take
place within a single labor market. In fact, recent technological and institutional changes
have allowed for the formation of cross-country teams. We have studied this problem in
recent work (Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2005), and refer the reader there.
Second, hierarchies do more than acquire and communicate knowledge, as the literature
discussed in the introduction suggests. Future work embedding other models of hierarchy
in an equilibrium framework is required in order to gauge the performance of our theory.
Third, we have focused on the impact of heterogeneity in cognitive ability among agents;
future work should study how heterogeneity in communication costs aﬀects equilibrium
organization and wages. Finally, we believe that the type of equilibrium model developed
in this paper is a ﬁrst step towards incorporating a richer organizational structure into
dynamic equilibrium models. These models could then, for example, be used to study
the dynamic relationship between ﬁrm size and wage inequality without relying, as in this
paper, on comparative statics exercises.
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358A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . We need to show that da(α)/dα = dαl+1/dαl > 0 all l<L .W eh a v e
established in the text (see equation 6) that for l ≤ L
w0 (αl)=z(ql).







Doing the same for l +1we obtain that if dql/dαl 6=0(it may be the case that dq0/dα0 =0 , then






























if w0 (·) is monotone. To show that w0 (·) is monotone, suppose it is not. Then if w00 (·) is continuous,
by the Mean Value Theorem there exists a ¯ α such that w00 (¯ α)=0 . If w00 (·) is not continuous, then
either there exists a ¯ α such that w00 (¯ α)=0 ,o rt h e r ee x i s t sa¯ α such that w00 (¯ α − ε)w00 (¯ α + ε) < 0
for all ε>0.I ft h e r ee x i s t sa¯ α such that w00 (¯ α)=0 , then if ¯ α is employed in layer l,
dαl
dαl+1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
αl=¯ α
= ∞.
This, however, contradicts equation (28) since φ(αl)/φ(αl+1) is ﬁnite and (28) needs to hold point
by point. Now consider the case where w00 (·) has a discontinuity and changes signs at ¯ α.I nt h a t
case the above condition implies
dαl
dαl+1















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
αl↓¯ α
< 0.
This, however, cannot maximize ﬁrm’s proﬁts since at least for one of these choices problem (4) is



















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
αl↓¯ α
< 0.
This again implies a contradiction with (28). Hence, w00 (·) is monotone, in fact the above argument
shows that w(·) has to be convex, since if not the problem in (4) is convex in abilities which leads
36to corner solutions, which are not allowed by the labor market equilibrium condition (28). Notice




To ﬁnish the proof we just need to show that in fact p00 (ql;w) < 0. Note however that we can use a
similar argument to the one above to show that this has to be the case in equilibrium. First note
that by (9) and z00 > 0 p00 (q0;w) < 0.F o rl>0, towards a contradiction assume that p00 (ql;w) ≥ 0,
then the problem in (11) given by
max
ql [ql+1 − ql − h(1 − ql)[c(αl+1;t)z(ql+1)+w(αl+1)] + p(ql;,w)],
is not concave in ql (which comes from the fact that the expression is concave in ql+1 since z00 (·) > 0
and the the cross-derivative is positive). Thus, manager’s proﬁt maximization is solved at a corner.
This implies that dql/dαl =0 , and therefore that w00 (αl)=0 , for an interval with positive Lebesgue
measure and l>0. This again implies that
dαl
dαl+1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
αl=¯ α
= ∞ for l>0.
for an interval of positive Lebesgue measure, which contradicts (28). Therefore, p00 (ql;w) < 0 and
so in any equilibrium of this economy the assignment exhibits positive sorting in all layers of the
hierarchy.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . The proof of Proposition 1 shows that the wage function is convex.
Since
w0 (αl)=z(ql) > 0,
we also know that the wage function has to be increasing within a layer. From the agent’s occu-
pational choice (3) we know that wages have to be continuous, since if not some agents would like
to choose a job that is not designed for their ability, which is inconsistent with (6). Thus the wage
function is increasing. Note that this result, together with the above equation implies that q (·) is
increasing since z0 (·) > 0 and w is convex. Of course, in general, q (·) will not be continuous since
the wage function does not have to be diﬀerentiable in the thresholds that divide layers.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Consider the knowledge choice of a production worker (20),
w(α0)=m a x
q0
[q0 − p(q0;·) − c(α0;t)z(q0)]. (31)
while if self-employed the worker chooses: maxq0 [q0 − c(α0;t)z(q0)]. The worker receives a positive
transfer for the problems she does not know and passes on, since −p(q0;·) > 0. The marginal value
of worker knowledge is lower with organization (1 − p0 (q0;·) < 1) than in self-employment, and the
marginal cost is the same. Thus the knowledge the worker acquires, q0, is lower than in autarchy,
and so is the marginal value of her skill by (6).
Consider now the choice of q of the highest level problem solver (22):
w(αL)= m a x
qL,qL−1
∙





If the worker is self-employed she solves maxqL [qL − c(αL;t)z(qL)] instead. The marginal value
of knowledge of an entrepreneur in (32) is 1 times the number of workers who ask her questions,
1/h(1 − qL−1) which is greater than 1 (the marginal value of knowledge under self-employment),
and the marginal cost is the same as when she is working on her own; thus the knowledge acquired
37by an entrepreneur is higher than what it would be if she was working on her own, and so is the
marginal value of skill w0 from (6).¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Take an equilibrium with a maximum number of L layers. Propo-
sition (1) guarantees that such an equilibrium exhibits positive sorting. Thus, in order to show
that the equilibrium exhibits occupational stratiﬁcation we need to show that self-matching is not
an option and that the set of entrepreneurs is a connected set. To show that self-matching is not
optimal for an employer note that since by assumption the equilibrium has L layers, w(αL) > 0.I f
entrepreneur L were to self-match (hire an employee in layer L−1 with ability αL) she would have
an income of
−c(αL;t)z(qL)
which is negative, and where we are using p(αL;·)=0since there are entrepreneurs with ability
αL. A parallel arguments goes through for intermediate layers since the term
ql − ql−1 + p(ql−1;·) − p(ql;·)
in equation 18 is equal to zero with self-matching. Thus, self-matching never maximizes ﬁrm proﬁts.
We now turn to the proof that the set of entrepreneurs is connected, so an equilibrium where
the entrepreneur in a team has lower ability than the worker or intermediate manager in another
team is not a possibility. Equation (14) implies that p0 (q (α);·) > 0 for all intermediate managers
and workers and by condition (21), p(q(α);·) ≥ 0 for all α ≥ a−1 (1). Suppose that the set of




such that p(q (ˆ α);·) ≥ 0. To economize
on notation let ˆ α be the largest such ability level. Then, since by equation (14),p 0 (q (α);·) > 0 for








. Furthermore, ¯ α works as a worker
or middle manager. The earnings of a person with ability ¯ α are given by
w(¯ α)=




− p(q (¯ α);·)
h(1 − a−1 (¯ α))
− c(¯ α;t)z(q(¯ α)).
However, if the same agent works as an entrepreneur, with exactly the same team of agents below
her, she would earn,




h(1 − a−1 (¯ α))
− c(¯ α;t)z(q (¯ α)) >w(¯ α)
where the inequality comes from p(q (¯ α);·) > 0. A contradiction with the agent’s maximization
problem in (3). Therefore the set of entrepreneurs is connected and includes the agents with the
highest ability. The last part of the proof involves showing that lower ability agents work for lower
ability layers of teams. This, however, is immediate from the fact that by a parallel argument to the
one used for self-matching, hiring subordinates with higher ability is never optimal since it yields
negative earnings.¤
Proof of Proposition 5. To go through this proof it may prove helpful to refer to Fig-
ure 2. Fix a maximum number of layers L, a vector of thresholds   α
L
01 ≡ (α01,α 12,...,αL−2L−1,
αL−1L−1,α L−1L,α LL+1 =1 ) 27 and a vector of wages   ω
L
















27We are using a notation in which the subindex of the vector of thresholds refers to the subrindex of the
ﬁrst element of the vector. The superindex refers to the number of layers.
38for l =1 ,...,L − 1. Notice that by Proposition 4 we are focusing only on the relevant thresholds
and that we are assuming that the initial wages are higher than the wages that agents could get
if they lead the worst possible team (the one formed by the threshold agents) with the number of
layers given by their position. Also by deﬁnition ω0 <ω 1 < ... < ωL−1. If wages are below these
thresholds then everyone is self-employed or the equilibrium has less than L layers. Given this, we
can solve the problems in (4) for all hierarchies with top entrepreneurs in [αL−1,L−1,α L−1L],a n d
therefore L − 1 layers, and with entrepreneurs in [αL−1L,1] and L l a y e r s . T od os o ,s o l v ef o rt h e
level of knowledge q at the thresholds, then use (6) to calculate wages at nearby locations and (29)
to calculate assignments. For entrepreneurs use (19) and (21) with equality to calculate their wages
and use (11) to calculate transfers. Let q(α;  ω
L
0 ,  α
L













denote the knowledge, wage, assignment and transfer functions obtained. Note that the Theorem of
the Maximum ensures that all functions q, w, and a are continuous in the elements of   ω
L
0,   α
L
01, and
α within layers. By deﬁnition
w(0;  ω
L











0 ,  α
L
01)=ωL−2,
and the assignment functions are invertible since they are singled valued and monotone as shown
in Proposition (1). Note that in this allocation wages are not continuous and supply and demand
for workers do not necessarily equalize at the thresholds (Equilibrium conditions i and iv are not









α : w(α;  ω
L







Given our restrictions on   ω
L
0 the function α∗
00 is well deﬁned (w is an increasing function of α by
equation (6) and ω0 <ω 1). Since the problem in (4) is continuous in w, by the Theorem of the
Maximum it is also a continuous function of the elements of   ω
L
0. Notice also that since w is continuous
in the entries of   α
L
01, α∗
01 is continuous in the entries of   α
L






strictly decreasing function of ω0 since w is increasing in α.
Deﬁne the excess supply of workers as a function of the vector of thresholds and the wage of the
lowest ability worker by
ES(  ω
L








































ω : ES((ω,  ω
L





We need to show that ω∗
0(  ω
L
1 ,  α
L
12) is well deﬁned, continuous and singled valued. First notice that





























39since in this case α∗














since in this case workers α∗
01 = α12. Hence, by the Mean Value Theorem, ω∗
0 exists.
The function ES is a strictly decreasing function of ω ∈ [ω0,ω1] and hence there is a unique
value at which it is equal to zero. To show ES is decreasing in ω note that as ω increases q (0) is
not aﬀected (since by (9) ω aﬀects p(0;·) but not p0 (0;·), and so the choice of q (0) in (10) is not
aﬀected given ω1). A parallel argument goes through for all α ∈ [0,α ∗
01]. The result then follows
from α∗
01 being a strictly decreasing function of ω0,a n dES an increasing function of α∗
01.W i t ht h i s









ω : ES((ω,  ω
L





The argument above implies that ω∗
0 exists, is single valued and continuous in both arguments.












































































for all l =1 ,...,L − 2. Clearly, we are abusing notation and ignoring the dependence of all function
on thresholds for which we have obtained an equilibrium function. Clearly all of these functions are
well deﬁned, singled valued, and continuous by arguments that parallel the arguments above.
The earnings of entrepreneurs at αL
L−1L−1 and αL





















































































where we are ignoring the dependence on αL
L−1L−1 and αL
L−1L in the notation of all functions. Hence

















































where the only diﬀerence with the equations for intermediate layers is that entrepreneurs of layer
L − 1 do not form part of the supply of managers of layer L − 1 and we are solving for a threshold
that divides managers and entrepreneurs within a layer, α∗
L−1L−1.
We still need to determine the threshold α∗
L−1L.D e ﬁne
α∗
L−1L ≡ min[{α : w(α)=ωL (α)},1].
Since all other thresholds and wages are now endogenous, we have a wage function (given our abuse
of notation noted above) that depends only on α. To show that this function is well deﬁned and
singled valued we can use similar arguments as the ones used above.
The construction of an allocation described above is identical for all layers except the last two.
Layer L − 1 is special because it is the only layer that contains a threshold that divides the set of
managers and the set of entrepreneurs. Whether of not an equilibrium has L layers depends on
whether the above algorithm implies that this threshold is in a corner or internal to layer L − 1.I f
it is in a corner, wages are not continuous (apart from the case where in equilibrium the number of
entrepreneurs of layer L − 1 is exactly zero, a point in the parameter space), and the equilibrium
number of layers is diﬀerent than L. As we will show below, modifying the number of layers will
eventually lead to an internal threshold. This then determines the equilibrium number of layers.
The construction above allows for two situations in which the allocation found is not an equi-








6= ωL−1L−1. A case in which there are no entrepreneurs of







6= ωL−1L−1 so α∗
L−1L =1 .
That is, the case where there are no entrepreneurs of layer L.T h eﬁrst case indicates that the equi-
librium number of layers is larger than L, the second that the equilibrium number of layers is lower












= ωL−1L−1.I no r d e r

















Suppose we are in the ﬁrst case so the number of layers is larger than L. Now consider the wage









































1 − q (a−1 (1;L);L)
=0 . (34)
To prove this last statement, note that {q (α;L)}
∞
L=1 is a bounded and monotone sequence and so





























→ 1 implies that limL→∞
£




6=0 ,ac o n t r a -








> 0 for suﬃciently large L in order for






=0 ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tp(q (1);L) > 0,
and so, since by the Theorem of the Maximum p is continuous and q is continuous between layers,






, and by construction
α = α∗
L−1L−1. Hence, there exists an equilibrium allocation with L∗ layers.
Suppose alternatively that we are in the second case so that the number of layers is lower than
L. C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew i t h1 layer. Then p(q (α)) = q (α) − c(α;t)z(q (α)) − w(α). If p(q (α)) ≥ 0
then L =0and we have found an equilibrium number of layers. If not then p(q (α)) < 0 and L>0.







. Thus, there exists an equilibrium allocation with L∗ layers.
We turn now to show that the constructed equilibrium allocation is unique. The arguments
above shows how to construct an equilibrium allocation, given the results in Propositions 1, 2, and
4. Furthermore, the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2 imply that the wage function is
convex and such that the solution to the problem in (4) is unique. Hence, this construction yields
a unique allocation since all thresholds, and wages at these thresholds, are uniquely determined.
Therefore, we have found the unique allocation with the properties described in Propositions 1, 2,
and 4, and since any equilibrium has to exhibit these properties, the equilibrium is unique.¤
Proof of Proposition 6. First, note that the First Welfare Theorem applies using the standard
argument. That is, consider a competitive equilibrium with wages w(α). Suppose that there is an
alternative feasible allocation where some workers are allocated to diﬀerent ﬁrms and where output
is higher. This, however, constitutes a contradiction of the deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium,
since in equilibrium ﬁrms maximize proﬁts given w(α). Intuitively, there exist complementarities,
(see Section 3.1), but they are priced (in the ﬁrm case, they are internalized by the ﬁrm) and thus
no improvement on the competitive equilibrium is possible.
Although the general argument holds, writing the Social Planner’s problem is illustrative and
provides an alternative way of proving the result. To do this, notice ﬁrst that the existence of com-
plementarities between the skills of agents at consecutive layers implies that the optimal allocation
must exhibit positive sorting. Towards a contradiction, suppose it does not. Then there exist a pair
of managers, where the less skilled one hires better subordinates. The planner would then prefer to
switch the subordinates of these two managers and assign the talented subordinates to the talented
manager, since complementarity in production implies that this reallocation increases total output.































, ALE =[ α∗








φ(a(α)) for α ∈ AM\A0M
h(1 − q(α))
φ(α)
φ(a(α)) for α ∈ A0M
a∗














=1∀ l =0 ,...,L − 2.
Note that the ﬁrst term is just the integral over all entrepreneurs of qLn0 after substituting (5). Let
λ(α) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the ﬁrst constraint (where we incorporate below
28Note that this reasoning goes through only because knowledge is cumulative. If knowledge was not
cumulative we would need to impose more restrictions on the support of f.
42φ(α)/φ(a(α)) as part of the co-state). Then, the maximum principle’s necessary conditions for this
problem are given by
1
h(1 − q (a−1 (α)))







φ(α)+λ(α)=0 for α ∈ AM\A0M, (36)
−c(α;t)z0 (q (α))φ(α)+hλ(α)=0 for α ∈ A0M. (37)












φ(α)=c(a(α);t)z0 (q (a(α)))q0 (a(α))φ(α) for α ∈ AM,(39)
where the second equality in each equation follows from substituting the ﬁrst order conditions. All
other conditions are either pinned down by the constraints or by the continuity of λ(α) (for example
p continuous and therefore that the set of entrepreneurs is connected).
Comparing (35) — (37) with (12) — (14), combined with (16) and (17) to obtain an Euler equation
that is not a function of p, we obtain that in order for the equilibrium allocation to be eﬃcient
λ(α)
φ(α)








=[ c0 (a(α);t)z (q (a(α))) + w0 (a(α)) + c(a(α);t)z0 (q(a(α)))q0 (a(α))]φ(α)
The equations above combined with (38) and (39) then imply that
w0 (α)=c0 (α;t)z (q(α)),
as in (6). Since all other optimality conditions are then equivalent to the equilibrium conditions this
implies that the proof of Proposition 5 applies and so the equilibrium allocation is Pareto Optimal.¤
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